Multiple Causes of Loss and Claims for Contribution by Todd S
 
MULTIPLE CAUSES OF LOSS AND CLAIMS FOR CONTRIBUTION 
STEPHEN TODD* 
In Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd1 the New Zealand 
Supreme Court dealt with a number of inter-related questions. These were: whether a 
council owed a duty of care to purchasers of land in issuing a Land Information 
Memorandum which misstated the water rights associated with the land; whether 
damages payable by the vendors, for similarly misrepresenting the water rights, should 
be based on the difference between the value of the land contracted for and the value 
obtained or on the cost of providing the represented quantity of water; whether the 
council could be seen to have caused the purchasers to suffer loss in circumstances 
where the purchasers retained the ability to claim damages for misrepresentation under 
the contract with the vendors; and whether the vendors could obtain an order for 
contribution in equity from the council. The article examines and evaluates the differing 
views expressed by the members of the Court about each of these issues. In the result 
the vendors’ claim for contribution was rejected, which decision has left the law in an 
unsatisfactory state. Basing the right to claim contribution on the question whether 
enforcement by a plaintiff against person A discharges, in whole or part, any obligation 
to pay the plaintiff owed by person B would resolve the problem. 
1. Introduction 
Where two or more tortfeasors cause the same damage to the one plaintiff, a 
long-established rule of the common law allows the victim to sue all or any of 
the tortfeasors and obtain judgment against each for the full amount of the 
loss.
2
 The tortfeasors’ liability is said to be in solidum. Of course, the plaintiff 
cannot actually recover damages for more than his or her whole loss: full 
satisfaction of the plaintiff’s claim always bars further proceedings.
3
 The 
common law rule means that the plaintiff need not prove exactly how large a 
part each defendant played in causing the damage; and he or she is not 
prejudiced if not all of the possible defendants can be found, or are solvent, or 
are insured. By s 17(1)(c) of the Law Reform Act 1936, a tortfeasor who is 
sued or who settles can seek to recover a contribution from any other tortfeasor 
who is liable in respect of the same damage. However, the risk of non-
satisfaction lies with the person claiming contribution, not the plaintiff. 
These principles may well operate reasonably satisfactorily in 
circumstances where the possible defendants are all tortfeasors and it is clear 
that they all cause the same loss. But complications arise where the defendants 
are or may be liable on some basis other than in tort and/or where the damage 
they have caused to the plaintiff is not or may not be the same. The decision of 
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the Supreme Court in Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint 
Venture Ltd
4
 provides a good illustration of these complications and of the 
legal difficulties they create. 
The purchasers of a farm were misled about the farm’s water permits by 
the vendors’ real estate agents, who referred to permits that were no longer 
current; by the vendors’ solicitors, who approved the agreement; and by the 
local council in its provision of wrong information about the permits in the 
Land Information Memorandum (the LIM). In fact, resource consents had been 
granted to extract only half of the promised amount of water. The purchasers 
issued proceedings seeking damages from the vendors and from the Council. 
The damages claimed were for the cost of obtaining additional water and for 
the cost of building a dam to store water for the future. The Council denied 
that it owed the purchasers any duty of care or that it had caused them loss, and 
also resisted a claim by the vendors for contribution. The vendors argued that 
they should be liable only for the difference between the value of the land with 
the water rights as represented and its value with the rights as actually granted, 
and not for the full cost of providing the promised water. In the High Court it 
was held that the purchasers could recover from the vendors the full cost of 
providing the water and that the Council also caused loss and should contribute 
a share of the damages payable by the vendors. Appeals by the vendors’ agents 
and the Council to the Court of Appeal were dismissed (save as to the quantum 
of damages payable by the Council).
5
 The defendants appealed further to the 
Supreme Court, which allowed the Council’s appeal on grounds to be 
explained below. 
The various issues that are raised by the facts and claims are inter-related. 
We will look first at the different bases for the imposition of liability – on the 
vendors and their agents (for failure to provide the agreed water rights) and on 
the Council (for a misstatement inducing entry into the contract to buy the 
land). Secondly, we must consider the measure of damages under each cause 
of action and the significance of the fact that the two measures differ. This 
leads, thirdly, to a consideration of the cause of the purchasers’ loss. And 
finally, we arrive at our core concern, which is the question whether, in light of 
the Court’s findings on the above issues, the basis for a claim for contribution 
by the vendors against the Council could be seen to exist. 
2. Liability of the vendors 
The liability of the vendors arose pursuant to the provisions of s 6 of the 
Contractual Remedies Act 1979. Section 6(1)(a) provides that if a party to a 
contract has been induced to enter into it by a misrepresentation, whether 
innocent or fraudulent, made to him or her by or on behalf of another party to 
that contract, he or she is entitled to damages from the other party in the same 
manner and to the same extent as if the representation were a term of the 
contract that has been broken. At the same time, by s 6(1)(b), there can be no 
liability in damages for deceit or negligence. Thus, liability for pre-contractual 
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representations is treated as a contractual matter. Such liability is dependent 
not on proof of negligence but simply on meeting the terms of the statute. 
There was no argument in Altimarloch before the Supreme Court about the 
vendors’ liability under s 6. But the question as to the measure of damages 
payable by the vendors was much disputed, as will be discussed shortly. 
3. Liability of the Council 
The Court was unanimous in holding that the Council owed a duty of care to 
the purchasers in issuing the LIM. Tipping J observed that the relationship 
between the parties was closely analogous to a contractual one, the purchasers 
paying a fee for the LIM. It was plain from the legislation providing for the 
issue of LIMs
6
 that Parliament recognised and emphasised that those obtaining 
LIMs from territorial authorities were entitled to rely on the accuracy of the 
information that was required under s 44A(2) to be included. The subsection 
was apt to encourage general reliance on the LIM’s contents, and that was a 
significant indicator that, as a matter of policy, those relying on LIMs should 
not be denied the duty of care that proximity considerations suggested should 
exist. The precise purpose for which the LIM was sought did not need to be 
known by the Council and there was nothing in the statutory regime which 
suggested that the Council’s liability in issuing a LIM should be confined to 
safety or other limited issues. So both proximity and policy considerations 




Two brief comments are needed. First, there was no question of s 6 of the 
Contractual Remedies Act 1979 applying to the claim against the Council. 
Although the Council’s misstatement was a contributory factor in inducing the 
purchasers to enter the contract of purchase, the Council of course was not a 
party to that contract. And it is clear that the negligence action remains 
available where the person being sued has induced the plaintiff to enter into a 
contract with someone else. So ordinary common law liability attaches to a 
misstatement by an agent inducing a contract between the representee and the 
principal,
8
 or by anyone else inducing a contract between others.
9
 
As regards the basis for the duty, this involved a fairly straightforward 
application of Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd.
10
 Tipping J 
refers, just a little mysteriously, to a “general reliance” on the LIM’s contents, 
whereas Hedley Byrne claims require actual, specific, reliance on the words in 
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question. No doubt Tipping J was not intending to introduce the uncertainties 
surrounding the concept of general reliance,
11
 and was saying simply that 
purchasers were apt to rely on LIMs for all kinds of reasons and that this was 
contemplated by the relevant legislation. Certainly the relationship between the 
Council and the purchasers was close and proximate. Indeed, as his Honour 
recognised, the Council here supplied the service for a fee, which prompts us 
to wonder why the relationship was seen as closely analogous to contract but 
not, in fact, contractual. 
4. The measure of damages 
 Although both vendors and Council could be liable, the measure of damages 
payable by the vendors was determined to be much greater than the measure 
payable by the Council. An explanation is found in the different measures 
payable in contract and in tort.  
In claims in contract the plaintiff is entitled to be put into the position he or 
she would have been in if the contract had been performed. In other words, the 
plaintiff can seek to be compensated for the loss of the bargain. But this loss 
may be measured in different ways – by the difference in value between what 
was promised and what was supplied, or by the cost of curing the breach. In 
the instant case the evidence established that the difference between the market 
value of the property with the water rights as represented and its market value 
without those rights was $400,000. By contrast, the cost of curing the breach 
was $1,055,907, which was the cost of buying extra water rights and of 
building a dam to make up for the water shortfall. The Supreme Court decided 
by a majority of three to two that the purchasers were entitled to recover this 
higher amount from the vendors. 
In claims in tort the damages seek to restore the plaintiff to the position he 
or she would have been in had the tort not been committed. Here the plaintiffs 
had acquired property worth $400,000 less than its market value with the 
promised water rights, but the contract price was $275,000 below that market 
value. So the plaintiffs’ loss on a tort basis was $125,000 – the difference 
between what the plaintiffs had paid and the value of what they had got, which 
was the land with the limited water rights. This was the only measure available 
for the purchasers’ claim against the Council. 
Let us consider first the reasoning which led the Court to award full “cost 
of cure” damages against the vendors. Tipping J said that what damages were 
appropriate was a question of fact. There were no absolute rules and the key 
purpose when assessing damages was to reflect the extent of the loss actually 
and reasonably suffered by the plaintiff. This might be measured on a 
difference in value basis or on a performance basis, the damages representing 
the amount needed to enable the plaintiff to have the contract performed as 
fully as was reasonable and possible. 
His Honour cited two modern cases of high persuasive authority as 
background. In Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v Forsyth
12
 the House 
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of Lords held that it was not reasonable for an owner to insist on the rebuilding 
of a swimming pool which was not as deep as the contract required, because 
the pool was still perfectly suitable for diving and the cost would be out of 
proportion to the benefit that would be obtained. On the other hand, in Tabcorp 
Holdings Ltd v Bowen Investments Pty Ltd
13
 the High Court of Australia held 
that a tenant who had covenanted with the landlord not to make any substantial 
alteration to the entrance lobby of the premises, and who then altered the lobby 
without the landlord’s consent, was liable for the cost of restoring the premises 
to their former state, even though this was substantially more than the 
diminution in value of the premises. It was held to be reasonable for the 
landlord to insist on restoration, so the proper measure of damages was the 
cost of doing so. 
 In the instant case such limited extra water rights as were available had 
been purchased, but the evidence showed that only by building a dam could 
the purchasers be reasonably assured of having available the full quantity of 
water which the vendors had contracted to supply. There was no basis for 
contending that it would have been reasonable for the purchasers to have sold 
the land and endeavoured to have established their vineyard elsewhere. They 
did not find out about the problem until after the sale and purchase had been 
settled, when they were in the process of establishing their vines. If they had 
elected to settle with knowledge of the shortfall the position might have been 
different. The question of reasonableness should be assessed against the 
premise that parties enter into contracts with the expectation of performance, 
not with the expectation of compensation for breach. There was nothing to 
suggest that simply because the performance measure was substantially more 
than the compensation measure the former was an unreasonable response to 
the vendors’ breach, nor that the performance measure was disproportionate to 
the benefit to be obtained.  
Blanchard and McGrath JJ expressed similar views. But Elias CJ 
(Anderson J agreeing) thought differently. Her Honour maintained that the 
usual measure of damages for breach of contract was the difference between 
the value contracted for and the value obtained, but recognised that that 
measure might not always be appropriate. Here she considered that expectation 
losses were properly met by damages reflecting the loss in value of the bargain 
and that the authorities on cost of cure did not support use of that measure to 
secure “functional equivalence” of a representation the value of which was 
able to be measured in loss of value in the bargain. The contract was one for 
the purchase of land, in respect of which a market existed and value could be 
objectively assessed to reflect the breach of warranty. It was not a contract for 
building work, and the construction of a dam was not stipulated performance. 
The authorities concerning defective performance of contracts to supply 
services, construct buildings or keep premises in repair were not in point. The 
contractual stipulation was to transfer the agreed water rights to the purchasers 
on settlement. The purchasers’ loss was that the property was worth less than it 
would have been had the representation been true, and such loss could be met 
in full by damages for the difference in value. Furthermore, even if cost of cure 
had been appropriate to achieve conformity with the contract, it was not 
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reasonable because it was disproportionate to the benefit obtained. The price 
paid for the additional water rights was itself partial cost of cure, to which the 
additional cost of constructing the dam had been added. That total cost 
($1.05m) was to be contrasted with the purchase price of the property 
($2.675m) and its value without the water rights ($2.55m). The disparity was 
direct evidence against which to assess the reasonableness of this cost of cure. 
It was out of proportion to the increase in value of the property and was 
unreasonable.  
Her Honour accepted that the reasonableness of a proposed measure of 
damages might not always be adequately assessed by a purely economic 
comparison. Where performance had been stipulated for, the parties might 
more readily be taken to expect that damages should enable the party to obtain 
performance. But this was not such a case. The cost of storage in a dam was a 
proxy for achieving “functional equivalence”. It was not a case where the 
parties could reasonably have expected such a result, at any cost. Nor was it a 
case where difference in value damages was inadequate to meet the 
expectations of the parties. And it was not difficult to envisage that the 
construction of permanent storage capacity might have had advantages over 
water rights which were limited in duration (although generally renewed), and 
which might be subject to controls in times of shortage despite their priority 
over other water rights. Although it might have been accurate enough to 
characterise the lost expectation in terms of water, the contract was not for the 
supply of water but for the delivery of rights to water.
14
 
Elias CJ’s view very arguably is the more convincing.
15
 The key point is 
that there was no contractual obligation to build the dam. Its cost was seen by 
the majority as equivalent to the grant of water rights, the full measure of the 
promised rights being impossible to obtain. But in the result the plaintiffs 
obtained damages representing a different, and more valuable, benefit than that 
which was promised.
16
 A right to water is not at all the same thing as a lake 
with water already in it. Suppose due to a lack of rain there was not enough 
water available to satisfy the purchasers’ full rights. The capacity to use stored 
water would or might be a critical advantage. Further, it does not appear that 
the plaintiffs were, or could be, under any kind of obligation to spend the 
money on the dam, although Tipping J did say that the plaintiff must have a 
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genuine intention to expend the damages to protect the performance interest. 
However, they could in fact retain the damages and sell the land, which would 
produce for them a very substantial profit.
17
 Alternatively, if they built the 
dam, the value of the land seemingly would be substantially enhanced, 
although by how much is not clear. At all events, the point that performance 
damages need not be expended on carrying out the work in question suggests 
that the courts should be particularly cautious before awarding them. The 
danger that the award of such damages may cause serious injustice is 
illustrated by the result in the Tabcorp case.18 The difference in value of the 
office premises in question with the old foyer and the new one was 
AUD34,820, whereas the total cost of restoring the foyer was AUD1.38m. The 
decision awarding this latter cost dealt with the question of reasonableness in a 
cursory fashion and ignored the question whether the landlord actually 
intended to restore the foyer.
19
 It seems unlikely in all the circumstances that 
the landlord would in fact spend the money on restoration,
20
 and the amount of 
the damages appears to have conferred on the landlord a very considerable 
windfall. It might indeed be seen to smack of an exemplary award, to punish 
the tenant for a deliberate breach of covenant. But there should be no question 
of punishing a contract-breaker.
21
 
5. The cause of the purchasers’ loss 
The measure of damages in the claim in tort against the Council was not 
performance based but was represented by the difference between the contract 
price and the value of the land without the water rights. However, the plaintiffs 
retained the ability to claim damages for misrepresentation under the contract 
with the vendors, and had in fact obtained a judgment for a sum exceeding the 
amount of the loss caused by the Council’s negligence. Ought the value of the 
plaintiffs’ contractual rights be taken into account? Once again the Court was 
split on the issue, three members taking the view that they should not and two 
that they should. Blanchard J
22
 considered that the Council could not say as a 
matter of law that the plaintiffs had suffered no loss for which it had to pay 
compensation unless and until the purchasers had received payment from the 
vendors for an amount at least equal to the diminution in the value of the land. 
The existence of the purchasers’ contractual rights and a judgment for their 
enforcement was not the equivalent of payment, even though there might be 
little doubt that payment would be made. It was true that in Nykredit Mortgage 
Bank plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd (No 2)
23
 the House of Lords said that it 
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was necessary to factor in the value of a lender’s claim in debt against a 
borrower under a personal covenant. But Nykredit concerned the date when a 
cause of action accrued, not the measurement of loss, and his Honour would 
not apply what was said in that case to a claim for damages. The court should 
not engage in prospective measurement of damages in cases of the present 
kind, just as it did not do so where both defendants were tortfeasors. Doing so 
placed the plaintiff at some risk of under-recovery – the risk that the contract 
defendant who appeared well able to pay might actually prove unable to meet 
its contractual obligations.  
McGrath J
24
 (Anderson J agreeing
25
) also took this view. His Honour 
pointed out, inter alia, that there was no duty on the purchasers to mitigate 
their loss arising from the Council’s negligence by first suing the vendors for 
breach of contract by their misrepresentations. Here the LIM resulted in the 
contract becoming unconditional, and it thereby caused the loss along with the 
vendors’ misrepresentation. The purchasers would not have confirmed the 
contract if the LIM had been correctly supplied. On ordinary principles of 
causation the Council’s negligence was an operative cause of the loss.  
Elias CJ and Tipping J dissented on this point. Tipping J
26
 drew upon 
conventional causation principles, but concluded, contrary to the majority 
view, that the Council’s misstatement did not cause loss to the plaintiffs. The 
LIM contributed to inducing the purchasers to enter the contract, and the 
essential question was what, if any, loss the plaintiff suffered from entering it. 
It would be artificial and contrary to authority to focus solely on the state of 
affairs when the contract was settled. The real issue was whether the contract 
was ultimately a loss-making one for the purchasers. It was only to the extent 
that the purchasers were left with a shortfall in their claim for breach of 
contract that it could be said that the Council’s negligence had caused them 
loss by inducing entry into the contract. If a purchaser first sued a vendor and 
actually recovered the full measure of its loss, that purchaser could not then 
commence further proceedings against the council. It would have no remaining 
loss to recover. The position could not logically be different when the 
purchaser sued the vendor and the council concurrently and the purchaser’s 
claim against the vendor resulted in full recovery. This view was supported by 
Nykredit, where Lord Nicholls said that if a negligent valuation which had 
induced a lender to lend on a deficient security had “in practice” caused no 
damage, there was no cause of action against the valuer. This signalled that the 
overall outcome of the transaction between contracting parties had to be 
assessed before the negligence of a third party could be said to have caused 
loss to one of the contracting parties. In substance their Lordships held that the 
contractual position needed to be fully worked through before it could be said 
that the valuer’s negligence had caused any loss to the lender. It needed to be 
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shown that the actual value of the security together with the actual value of the 
borrower’s personal covenant were less than the amount owing to the lender. 
Tipping J recognised that, in circumstances like the instant case, there was 
no reason why a plaintiff could not bring claims against both the contract-
breaker and the tortfeasor at the same time and in the same proceeding. When 
A entered into the contract it immediately acquired, at least prima facie, 
something worth less than the contract entitled it to receive. The damage A 
thereby suffered was capable of being reduced or eliminated by A’s right to 
claim damages for breach, but that did not mean that no cause of action arose 
at the outset. A could recover damages for breach of contract from the vendors 
and any ultimate shortfall in what the vendors were liable to pay, but only 
within the tortious measure. Sometimes it might be necessary to estimate the 
likely recovery from the contract-breaker in order to determine what, if any, 
loss had been caused by the tortfeasor. But here there had not been any 
question about the ability of the vendors to satisfy the amount of the judgment 
against them. They had the benefit of indemnities from their real estate agency 
and their solicitors. So the Council’s negligence caused no loss. 
Elias CJ thought similarly.
27
 Her view, in essence, was that detriment 
through inducement of a contract of sale was diminished by value obtained by 
the purchasers in exchange for the price paid. It was the ultimate net position 
of the purchasers that established their loss. All gains or advantages obtained 
through the transaction had to be brought into account to offset the loss. 
On this issue the majority view seems the better one. All agreed that on the 
date when A entered the contract a cause of action against the Council accrued 
in favour of A. The difference of opinion between their Honours was in 
whether the existence of A’s contractual rights against the vendor was relevant 
in determining whether the Council’s negligence caused loss. The minority 
argument, bringing this factor into account, may be criticised on the basis that 
it conflates the question of the cause of loss with the question whether or how 
a loss has been satisfied. Tipping J said that a purchaser who sued a vendor 
and recovered full damages could not then commence further proceedings 
against a defendant in the position of the Council. But this does not mean that 
the Council has not caused loss. On the contrary, it has caused loss but that 
loss has been fully satisfied by another. Satisfaction of a loss is an independent 
basis for barring proceedings against anyone else. Suppose now that the 
purchaser recovers only part of the loss from the vendor, or none of it. Clearly 
the Council has caused loss in such a case and has to pay the shortfall or the 
full amount of its liability. It is difficult to see how the cause of a loss can be 
seen to vary according to the likelihood of recovery against another. Rather, 
the negligence of the Council is a cause from the moment a cause of action 
accrues to the purchaser, and the Council remains liable to pay unless and until 
the loss is fully satisfied in some other way. This, of course, is the position 
where two or more tortfeasors cause an indivisible loss, and there is no 
compelling reason not to apply the same principle where one of the defendants 
is a contract-breaker. Suppose also that a purchaser sues the council and 
recovers damages and then brings proceedings against a vendor. The damages 
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already awarded would need to be brought into account as representing a 
partial satisfaction of the purchaser’s loss. 
6. Contribution in equity 
We recognised at the beginning of this discussion that there is a right to make a 
claim for contribution pursuant to the terms of s 17(1)(c) of the Law Reform 
Act 1936 only in circumstances involving two tortfeasors who are liable to the 
plaintiff in respect of the same damage. In Altimarloch the vendors of the land 
were liable to the purchasers in contract under s 6 of the Contractual Remedies 
Act 1979 on account of the misrepresentations by their agents concerning the 
extent of the water rights. So the vendors were contract-breakers. They were 
not tortfeasors liable in respect of the same damage as other liable tortfeasors, 
and accordingly they could not claim contribution under s 17(1)(c).
28
 So could 
the principles of equity fill this gap? The Supreme Court decided, once again 
in a majority decision, that they could not. Yet this result depends very much 
on the particular circumstances of the case and the views of the five justices 
about the various issues in contention. Altimarloch is not an impassable 
obstacle in the way of developing a jurisdiction in equity which might widen 
the availability of a right to contribution. Indeed it points the way towards 
resolving at least some of the problems associated with the Law Reform Act.
29
 
Four members of the Court agreed that the test to apply in deciding 
whether an order for contribution could be made was whether the liabilities 
were “of the same nature and extent”,
30
 but they could not agree on what this 
required. Tipping J took a strict view.
31
 His Honour said that equity would 
order a contribution when two parties were under a coordinate liability – a 
liability of the same nature and extent – to make good one loss, and one paid 
more than his or her proportionate share of that loss. In such circumstances the 
overpaying party could recover equalising contribution from the other party or 
parties. Because their liability was coordinate it was appropriate in equity for 
the liability to be shared. In the present case the liabilities of the parties were 
distinctly dissimilar. The liability of the vendors was in contract and that of the 
Council was in tort. The amounts for which each was liable were by no means 
the same. There was no one loss. No case had ever applied the equitable 
doctrine to the extent necessary to cover this degree of dissimilarity.  
Tipping J cited leading decisions as supporting this view. In Burke v LFOT 
Pty Ltd
32
 Gaudron ACJ and Hayne J said that the notion of coordinate liability 
depended on “common interest and common burden”, and also referred to 
                                                      
28  They would have been tortfeasors but for s 6, which has created this difficulty for 
contribution claims. 
29  See generally B Prewett “Wrongdoers’ Rights to Contribution in Mixed Liability Cases” 
[2012] NZ L Rev 643 for a helpful discussion of the issues. 
30  Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd [2012] NZSC 11, [2012]  
2 NZLR 726 at [75] per Blanchard J, at [129] per Tipping J, at [224] per McGrath J, at [235] 
per Anderson J. 
31  Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd [2012] NZSC 11, [2012]  
2 NZLR 726 at [124]–[152]. 
32  Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd [2002] HCA 17, (2002) 209 CLR 282. 
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paying more than a proper share to discharge a common obligation. McHugh J 
confirmed that in determining whether there was a common obligation, the 
traditional test was whether the liability of each party was “of the same nature 
and to the same extent”. And in relation to Burke itself he described the 
obligations in issue (under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and in 
negligence) as independent, not common. The leading case in England (under 
the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 (UK)) was Royal Brompton 
Hospital NHS Trust v Hammond.
33
 Lord Bingham noted that the liability to 
contribute “in respect of the same damage” emphasised the need for the one 
loss to be apportioned among those liable and that there was a clear difference 
between a common liability and an independent liability. Lord Steyn said that 
the notion of a common liability, and of sharing that common liability, lay at 
the root of the principle of contribution. The legislative context did not justify 
an expansive interpretation of “the same damage” so as to mean substantially 
or materially similar damage. Lord Hope thought similarly.  
Tipping J considered that in the instant case the liabilities were clearly 
independent because the causes of action were different (although his Honour 
accepted that this did not necessarily bar a claim) and the loss was not the 
same. There was no coordinate liability for the same loss, no single claim for 
which both parties were liable. Unless the courts were substantially to extend 
the principles of equitable contribution, the vendors could not obtain 
contribution from the Council. His Honour did not go on to consider whether 
the courts should undertake the necessary extension, because a further point 
would make it inappropriate to make an order even if, as a matter of law, it 
were possible to do so. If the Council was ordered to contribute to the amount 
payable by the vendors to the purchasers, the vendors would end up in receipt 
of more than the property, with its limited water rights, was truly worth. And 
there was no basis upon which the Council could be required to contribute to 
the amount paid by the vendors to the purchasers above the tortious measure, 
because the Council’s liability was tortious rather than contractual. 
Blanchard J agreed with Tipping J.
34
 His Honour considered that a 
tortfeasor was not liable to contribute to a loss of a character for which it could 
have no liability to the plaintiff. First, the amount which the vendors had been 
ordered to pay to the purchasers was entirely measured on a performance basis. 
The only loss for which the Council was responsible to the purchasers – 
diminution in value – was not of the same nature and extent as the 
contractually-measured loss. There was no common obligation or liability. 
Second, by seeking contribution from the Council on a diminution in value 
basis, the vendors would be seeking to have the Council refund to them an 
overpayment by the purchasers which they had been obliged to refund. So the 
vendors would have received more than the actual value of the land and would 
be restoring to the purchasers an amount they should not have received. On 
that measure there was no loss to the vendors for which the Council should be 
made liable. 
                                                      
33  Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v Hammond [2002] 1 WLR 1397 (HL). 
34  Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd [2012] NZSC 11, [2012]  
2 NZLR 726 at [75]–[76]. 
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McGrath J
35
 was prepared to take a more flexible approach. His Honour 
noted that the judges of the High Court in Burke differed on the scope of what 
constituted coordinate responsibilities for the purposes of contribution. 
McHugh J thought that there should be at least an involvement of the parties in 
a common design to achieve a common end, which narrowed the class of 
claims for which contribution was available. Callinan J thought similarly. But 
Gaudron ACJ and Hayne J did not include the limitation. They emphasised the 
requirement that liability should be of the same nature and extent, including 
the notions of culpability and causal significance. Kirby J took a wide view. 
He considered that the test for coordinate liabilities was whether “the liabilities 
of the co-obligors to the principal claimant were such that enforcement by [the 
claimant] against either co-obligor would diminish that obligor in his material 
substance to the value of the liability”.  
Applying the “same nature and extent” test, his Honour said that equity 
eschewed too technical an approach and that liability need not be predicated on 
the nature of the cause of action. It was now recognised that the test concerned 
the parties’ liability for the same damage. Here the parties made the same error 
in their representations which, in each case, induced the purchasers to enter the 
contract under a mistaken belief about the water rights. Each was an operative 
cause of the inducement. Neither party was misled by the other. Had either 
correctly stated the position, the error by the other would not have had the 
inducing effect. No question of differing degrees of culpability arose. The 
reality was that both the Council and the vendors made the same error, with the 
same result that caused the purchasers loss of the same nature. 
More difficult was the question whether the loss was of the same extent. 
The loss could be measured on a difference in value basis or on a reliance basis 
fixed by the cost of performance. The purchasers did not have an absolute 
entitlement to the latter, nor was it clear that damages would be so based. If 
detriment damages had been awarded, there would have been no obvious 
reason for the Council to demand that the purchasers first resort to the vendors 
for compensation. The Court’s decision on the matter would be a very narrow 
basis for determining whether the loss was of the same extent. 
McGrath J recognised that the Council’s contribution should be confined to 
one based on its liability, so that it was liable to contribute a share of the loss 
borne by the vendors in proportion to its contribution. This did not result in the 
vendors being “overpaid”. They would not receive any “profit” from the sale, 
even with contribution. The sum the Council had to pay should not be treated 
as being a supplement to the purchase price, a reimbursement of difference in 
value damages, or any other form of inequitable benefit. Rather, it was 
ensuring that all wrongdoers were held to account for their actions without 
relief from the exercise of their own causative power. Equity should seek to do 
justice without being defeated by too technical an approach. This was not a 
case like Burke where the negligent party had been misled by the vendors. 
Both parties had a causative effect and both should contribute.  
Anderson J agreed with McGrath J on this question. So two members of the 
Court favoured rejecting the claim for contribution, and two favoured allowing 
                                                      
35  Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd [2012] NZSC 11, [2012]  
2 NZLR 726 at [210]–[231]. 
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it. Elias CJ did not decide the question, but had sympathy for the wider view.
36
 
Her Honour accepted that equitable contribution was available where liabilities 
were in substance coordinate although the legal basis of the claim differed. 
But, as explained above, she considered that the liability for damages of the 
Council was dependent on the net position reached on the liability of the 
vendors for breach of contract, so there was no occasion for contribution 
between them. Indeed, in circumstances where the vendors’ representation was 
treated by statute as though a term of the contract (by s 6 of the Contractual 
Remedies Act 1979) it did not accord with the principles upon which 
contribution was ordered that the vendors should be able to spread the liability 
while retaining the benefit of overpayment. However, her Honour was 
reluctant to think that a just distribution of responsibility in a case where two 
or more parties were liable to the plaintiff in respect of damage, which was in 
substance the same, could not be achieved outside the application of the Law 
Reform Act 1936. Outside the application of s 6 of the Contractual Remedies 
Act 1979 there was, she thought, force in McGrath J’s approach, and she 
would want to consider further whether the liability of each defendant was 
properly to be seen as coordinate or of the same nature, justifying contribution. 
The result in Altimarloch was that the claim for contribution was rejected. 
But the Supreme Court’s decision nonetheless tends to support a flexible 
approach to the question whether a coordinate liability for the same loss can be 
found to exist, although further development of the principles to be applied is 
needed. There is certainly majority support for the proposition that the relevant 
causes of action need not be the same, the more controversial question being 
whether the damage was the same. Both Tipping J and Blanchard J emphasised 
the difference between damages based on diminution in value and damages 
based on cost of performance, pointing out that the Council could not be liable 
on the latter basis. However, the existence of a right to contribution should not 
depend on the basis upon which the plaintiff made his or her claim or, where 
both are asserted, on the court’s determination on which should be awarded. If 
damages had been based on difference in value this objection would have 
disappeared. An order for contribution ought to be possible to the extent of the 
potential liability to the plaintiff of the defendant from whom contribution is 
sought. So perhaps the “overpayment” argument is the more substantial. 
On the view of Elias CJ and Tipping J concerning the cause of the harm, 
the Council could not be liable to the purchasers and, accordingly, no order for 
contribution could be made. But on the finding of the majority (Blanchard, 
McGrath and Anderson JJ) that the Council was liable for having caused the 
loss to the purchasers, should we conclude that it would be an overpayment to 
the vendors to make the Council contribute? If the purchasers sued only the 
Council, it is hard to see why their claim should not succeed. Surely there is a 
loss in such a case, irrespective of whether the purchasers would, if sued, be 
able to satisfy any judgment against them. Seemingly, then, the reason why, on 
the view of a different majority (Elias CJ, Tipping and Blanchard JJ), the claim 
for contribution still ought to fail was that the vendors ought not to get it rather 
than that the Council ought not to pay it. This view focuses on the fact that the 
                                                      
36  Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd [2012] NZSC 11, [2012]  
2 NZLR 726 at [57]–[58]. 
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vendors would be unjustly enriched or, as their Honours preferred to put it, 
overpaid. Yet it might equally be argued that the Council has been unjustly 
enriched by the vendors being required to discharge its liability.
37
 If the 
Council had been sued alone it would have been held liable. So the 
overpayment argument cuts both ways, and the preferable approach is that of 
McGrath J, who focuses on accountability. Furthermore, and significantly, the 
majority view does not in any event amount to a substantial restriction on the 
scope of a claim for contribution in equity. Where there is no risk of 
overpayment of the vendors, the availability of such a claim remains; and here, 
in accordance with the views of a third majority (Elias CJ, McGrath and 
Anderson JJ), a broad, non-technical approach is, or at least may be, justified. 
Indeed, even Tipping J did not rule out the courts considering an extension of 
the relevant principles of equity as he saw them in cases where the 
overpayment argument did not arise. 
7. Impact of Altimarloch 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Altimarloch was delivered in early 2012, and 
already there are a number of cases considering its implications in relation to 
the various matters in issue.
38
 As regards contribution in equity, some 
applications are straightforward.
39
 However, express contractual provision can 
oust any right to contribution that might otherwise arise.
40
 In Pernod Ricard 
New Zealand Ltd v Lion – Beer, Spirits & Wine (NZ) Ltd
41
 Allan J declined to 
order the purchaser of wine brands, vineyards, plant and equipment to make a 
contribution towards the excise duty payable by the vendor on the finished 
goods sold pursuant to the agreement. His Honour considered that resort to 
contribution principles was inapt. The transaction was the subject of a number 
of very detailed contractual documents in which the parties carefully set out 
their respective rights and obligations. If the vendor was able to make out a 
case for relief on orthodox contractual principles (as it had) then it had no need 
for equitable relief. Had it failed on that argument (ie that there was an implied 
term in the contract that the purchaser would pay the duty), it would not have 
been right nevertheless to grant relief based upon contribution principles, 
because to do that would be, in effect, to rewrite the contract between the 
parties. 
The impact of Altimarloch in mixed liability cases not surprisingly is more 
controversial. In Coutts v Davenports Harbour Lawyers,
42
 Associate Judge 
Sargisson was satisfied that (as the law presently stood) a claim for 
                                                      
37  See Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd [2002] HCA 17, (2002) 209 CLR 282 at [112] per Kirby J. 
38  As regards the Council’s duty of care, see above n 7; as regards the measure of damages, see 
above n 14. 
39  For example, Selkirk v McIntyre [2013] NZHC 575, [2013] NZAR 480 (order for 
contribution between co-trustees). 
40  See Pan Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Creditcorp Ltd [1994] 1 All ER 470 at 475 [The Trident 
Beauty]. 
41  Pernod Ricard New Zealand Ltd v Lion – Beer, Spirits & Wine (NZ) Ltd [2012] NZHC 2801 
at [247]–[268]. 
42  Coutts v Davenports Harbour Lawyers [2012] NZHC 862 at [45]. 
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contribution which failed under s 17 of the Law Reform Act 1936 could not 
succeed in equity. In this case a homestead owned by a family trust was burned 
down in the course of its renovation by builders. The insurer of the homestead 
declined an insurance claim made by the trustees on the basis that the policy 
contained an exclusion clause for construction works. The trustees (P) 
thereupon brought proceedings in contract and tort against its solicitors (D1), 
alleging that they were in breach of their professional obligations by neglecting 
to ensure that there was adequate insurance in place to cover the risks of 
construction. D1 issued third party notices against the builders (D2), claiming 
that they were responsible for the fire and that it was entitled to a contribution 
pursuant to s 17(1)(c) of the Law Reform Act 1936 or on the application of the 
relevant principles of equity. P applied to have the third party notices set aside, 
and although the Judge had a degree of sympathy for D1 he acceded to the 
application. 
As regards s 17, Associate Judge Sargisson recognised that there could be 
an order for contribution only where D1 and D2 were liable in respect of the 
“same damage”. She noted that in the Royal Brompton case43 Lord Steyn 
rejected the wide test of mutual discharge and an expansive interpretation of 
these words, and asked instead whether there had been a sharing of a common 
liability. Her Honour thought also that it had to be inferred that in Altimarloch 
the Supreme Court approved of the narrow approach in s 17 cases. She 
accepted that the members of the Court did not speak with one voice on the 
issue, but pointed out that both Elias CJ and Tipping J (with whom Blanchard J 
agreed) applied aspects of the Royal Brompton decision, that a number of 
extracts from Tipping J’s judgment emphasised that “same damage” referred 
to a common liability as opposed to an independent liability, and that even 
McGrath J in his dissenting judgment referred to Royal Brompton with 
approval. In the instant case her Honour was satisfied, upon an acute 
evaluation and comparison of the claims, that D1 and D2 were not liable in 
respect of the same damage. The damage caused by the negligence of D2 was 
the destruction of the homestead by fire. The damage caused by the negligence 
of D1 was the inability to claim insurance. D1 and D2 did not share 
responsibility for either instance of negligence. 
Turning to the question of contribution in equity, her Honour considered 
similarly that no claim could be made. P’s claim against D1 included causes of 
action for negligence and for breach of contract. Altimarloch determined that 
the liabilities of the parties between whom equitable contribution could be 
ordered should be “of the same nature and extent”, and Tipping J confirmed 
that this required that all parties were under a coordinate liability for the same 
loss. It could not be said that equity widened the scope of the test upon which 
an order for contribution would be deemed appropriate. Here D1’s liability 
was in contract and tort for failing to ensure that the property was adequately 
insured, and D2’s liability was in tort for action or inaction that caused the 
destruction by fire. Although each party might be liable, the nature and the 
extent of each liability were distinct. There was no single claim for which both 
were liable. The liabilities were independent and the resultant damage or loss 
was not the “same”. 
                                                      
43  Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v Hammond [2002] 1 WLR 1397 (HL). 
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Section 17 of the Law Reform Act 1936 and the impact of Altimarloch 
were considered once again by Winkelmann J in Financial Markets Authority 
v Hotchin.
44
 In that case the Financial Markets Authority (FMA) alleged that 
the first defendant (D1) and the other directors of three companies had 
authorised the distribution of misleading company prospectuses, and sought 
compensation for the subscribers under s 55G of the Securities Act 1978. D1 
argued that the trustees of the companies’ trust deeds (D2) were liable to 
contribute to any compensation he was ordered to pay to the FMA and joined 
them as third parties to the proceedings. The trustees applied to strike out the 
claims against them. Winkelmann J held that the fact that the FMA had 
brought the claim on behalf of depositors ought not to exclude rights of 
contribution
45
 and that there was a tenable argument that the trustees owed 
duties to take care to use their powers to protect prospective investors.
46
 The 
question then became whether any tenable claims against the trustees were for 
the same damage. Her Honour maintained, drawing upon the Royal Brompton 
case, that the expression “the same damage” referred not to quantum of loss, or 
damages, but rather to the harm suffered by the depositors for which they were 
entitled to compensation. If it could be established that the trustees failed in 
their duty to monitor the affairs of the company for insolvency or breaches of 
the trust deeds, the damage resulting would be the losses incurred by the 
depositors while the trustees wrongfully failed to act. If it could be established 
that the directors made untrue statements, the damage resulting would be that 
the depositors invested in a company in reliance on untrue statements. These 
were different losses. Even if the trustees ought to have “pulled the plug” 
earlier, the trustees could not be liable for the loss independently caused by 
directors. The focus was on whether the liability was of “the same nature and 
to the same extent”, using the language adopted in the Burke case in Australia. 
Winkelmann J also was satisfied that the same principles underlay the law 
of equitable contribution, as seen in the Altimarloch decision. The common 
thread of the judgments in that case was that equitable contribution was 
available when the parties’ liability was of the same nature and extent. The fact 
that any loss recovered from one person would tend to reduce the loss 
recoverable from another was not a valid indicia of coordinate liability. The 
parties did not share such liability and the case should be struck out on this 
ground. 
                                                      
44  Financial Markets Authority v Hotchin [2013] NZHC 1611. 
45  Financial Markets Authority v Hotchin [2013] NZHC 1611 at [23]. Her Honour considered 
that any other view would produce capricious results. If the depositors themselves brought a 
claim against the directors at common law or under s 55G of the Securities Act 1978, rights 
of contribution would be available to the directors, but these would be lost if, on the trustees’ 
case, the FMA stepped in and brought a claim on the depositors’ behalf. 
46  Financial Markets Authority v Hotchin [2013] NZHC 1611 at [41]–[48]. Her Honour was 
satisfied that the trustees could arguably owe duties both under the trust deed and in tort, 
because the indications in the trust deeds that the trustees’ duties were owed to existing 
depositors were not decisive; the Act did not state to whom a trustee’s duty (specified in the 
regulations and deemed to be incorporated into the deeds) was owed, and there was nothing 
in the Act or regulations which was inconsistent with the extension of that duty to 
prospective depositors. 
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A further argument was that a person could not claim contribution from 
another either under the Law Reform Act 1936 or in equity if obliged to 
indemnify that other in respect of the damage in respect of which contribution 
was sought; and here, it was argued, the directors were obliged to indemnify 
the trustees. However, her Honour decided that any right to indemnity was not 
so clear cut that it justified striking out the claim. A negligent misstatement 
claim based on the directors’ certification to the trustees that the statements in 
the prospectuses were true and accurate would likely raise issues not inevitably 
resolved against the first defendant in the context of the FMA claim. The 
certificates spoke to only one particular point in time whereas statements in 
prospectuses continued to speak during the offer period. It might be that the 
opinions were not negligently expressed as at the date of the certificate but that 
the situation deteriorated thereafter. And there needed to be proof of reliance 
by the trustees, which issue might not be straightforward in circumstances 
where the trustee was also receiving information, reports and certificates from 
the auditors. 
8. Conclusions 
We have seen that the question whether coordinate liabilities are of the same 
nature and extent has given rise to significant differences of opinion, both in 
Altimarloch itself and in the leading overseas decisions. In this light we 
certainly can accept that Associate Judge Sargisson in the Coutts case47 and 
Winkelmann J in the Financial Markets Authority decision48 were correct in 
concluding that Altimarloch has not expanded the relevant principles of law 
concerning the availability of a right to contribution in equity. But the decision 
arguably does not bar any such expansion, and perhaps the opportunity for 
further development of the law remains. As we have seen, their Honours took 
different views about the circumstances in which two or more liabilities could 
be seen as being of the same nature and extent, yet McGrath J, with the 
agreement of Anderson J and the support of Elias CJ, eschewed a narrow 
understanding of this test. McGrath J’s focus was simply on whether the 
damage was the same, and this approach points to the way forward. 
Let us consider the matter from the standpoint of a plaintiff bringing two or 
more claims rather than a defendant bringing a claim for contribution against 
another potential defendant. A significant reason why we may need to know 
whether the conduct of both A and B has caused a plaintiff (P) to suffer the 
same damage is found in the rule that P cannot recover more than his or her 
actual loss. If P sues A and recovers damages and then brings a second action 
against B, fairly clearly B is entitled to bring into account the damages already 
paid to P by A to the extent that they cover the same loss claimed against B.
49
 
                                                      
47  Coutts v Davenports Harbour Lawyers [2012] NZHC 862. 
48  Financial Markets Authority v Hotchin [2013] NZHC 1611. 
49  It is possible that the rule in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 6 Hare 100 could come into 
play. This allows the court to strike out a claim which properly belonged to earlier litigation 
and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the 
time. The principle is founded on the public policy aimed at preventing a multiplicity of 
actions: Brisbane City Council v Attorney-General for Queensland [1979] AC 411 (PC) at 
425. See generally Stephen Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (6th ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2013) at [26.2]. 
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As we noted at the outset, full satisfaction of P’s claim against A bars further 
proceedings against A, and similarly it bars proceedings against any joint or 
concurrent wrongdoers. The reason, explained by Tipping J in Allison v KPMG 
Peat Marwick,50 is simply that the plaintiff’s loss no longer exists: there is 
nothing left for anyone to sue on. And even if there has been no full 
satisfaction, it follows that partial satisfaction must be a partial bar.
51
 
The availability of a claim for contribution as between defendants 
seemingly should operate on the same basis as the availability of a claim as 
between plaintiff and defendant that the whole or a part of a loss has been 
satisfied. After all, P is free to sue such defendant or defendants as he or she 
chooses. So if a claim by P against A results in P being awarded $X, and a 
subsequent claim against B can be defended on the basis that P’s claim has 
already been satisfied by the payment of $X by A, then surely A should be 
able to claim a contribution from B. Perhaps, then, the courts could develop a 
test which asks whether payment by A discharges, in whole or part, any 
obligation to pay owed by B. No doubt the resolution of the question 
sometimes could involve calculations of considerable complexity, but that 
does not mean that it would be incapable of judicial determination. Applying 
the test would involve determining the full extent of the damage caused by A 
and by B and then an assessment of the extent to which the damage in each 
case overlaps. Contribution principles could be applied to the overlapping part. 
This approach might indeed be recognised as a natural consequence of the rule 
that a plaintiff cannot recover damages in respect of a loss that has been 
satisfied by another. 
What matters, then, is whether the damage overlaps, not whether the 
liability of A and B is common as opposed to independent. Indeed, it is hard to 
see what exactly is achieved by an insistence on there being liabilities “of the 
same nature and extent” beyond formal adherence to a requirement laid down 
in certain existing decisions that is highly uncertain in its application. 
Furthermore, a test which asks instead whether a payment discharges another’s 
liability would determine only whether, in principle, an award of contribution 
could be made. It would not determine the size of any award. If a claim were 
held to be available, the court would need to exercise its discretion in 
determining whether an award ought to be made at all or in deciding the 
amount that ought to be awarded. By s 17(2) of the Law Reform Act 1936, the 
amount of any award of contribution recoverable from any person “shall be 
                                                      
50  Allison v KPMG Peat Marwick [2000] 1 NZLR 560 (CA) at 587, 589. 
51  Compare the situation where P1 brings a claim against A and recovers damages and then P2 
brings a second claim against A in respect of the same wrongdoing. This may happen where 
P1 recovers damages from A in respect of a defect in a building and sells to P2 without 
having repaired the building and without having disclosed the defect to P2. In this case any 
claim by P2 is not barred by A having satisfied the judgment in favour of P1. In North Shore 
City Council v Body Corporate 188529 [2010] NZSC 158, [2011] 2 NZLR 289 at [72] 
[Sunset Terraces], Tipping J said that the duty owed to a first owner is not transferred to the 
second owner on sale and nor is the loss. The duty is owed independently to the second 
owner, and the second owner should be able to recover loss suffered as a result of a breach of 
a duty owed to him, quite independently of the first owner’s position. Probably, however, 
P2’s claim would be treated as having been wholly caused by P1’s deceit: see Stephen Todd 
“Leaky Buildings: Limitation Issues and Successive Owners” in The Leaky Buildings Crisis 
(Brookers, Wellington, 2011) at 123–138. 
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such as may be found by the Court to be just and equitable, having regard to 
the extent of that person’s responsibility for the damage”. Certainly a claim for 
contribution in equity would need to be determined on a similar basis. 
In summary, the differing views about the circumstances in which two or 
more liabilities can be recognised as being of the same nature and extent 
suggests that it would be desirable to abandon the use of this test and to search 
for another, both in the interest of certainty in the law and in an attempt to 
articulate the core principle that ought to be applied in contribution cases. 
There is indeed a powerful case to be made in favour of the view taken by 
Kirby J in Burke,52 that the test should be, quite simply, whether enforcement 
against one wrongdoer will diminish the liability of the other. This very 
arguably would best give effect to the general principles of justice underlying 
contribution claims.
53
 These are founded ultimately on the principle that the 
wrongdoer whose liability is diminished has been unjustly enriched at the 
expense of the paying wrongdoer. In Ronex Properties Ltd v John Laing 
Construction Ltd
54
 Sir Sebag Shaw said, in relation to the statutory right of 
contribution between tortfeasors, that it resembled a claim by a plaintiff for 
money paid by him to the use of the defendant, who had been relieved, pro 
tanto, of his direct liability to the victim of the tort. There is indeed a clear 
analogy with unjust enrichment cases demonstrating a claimant’s right to 
reimbursement following his or her compulsory payment of another’s debt.
55
 
More generally, unjust enrichment at another party’s expense is an event to 
which the law responds by giving that party, in defined circumstances, a right 
to restitution of that enrichment. Recognising a right to contribution for the 
benefit of a party whose payment of damages has discharged another’s 
liability, in whole or part, would be a natural and fitting development. 
In light of what was decided in Altimarloch, it is uncertain whether the 
courts will now take further steps towards achieving this result. While not 
impossible, it would indeed be a notable feat of judicial creativity. It would 
depend also on the right case being litigated and, probably, being taken to the 
Supreme Court. Yet the question whether a claim for contribution ought to be 
available in mixed liability cases can frequently arise, and the consequences of 
the answer can be very significant. Perhaps, should the matter return to the 
Supreme Court, an answer giving effect to McGrath J’s wider view (but 
without the complication requiring that there be liabilities “of the same nature 
                                                      
52  Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd [2002] HCA 17, (2002) 209 CLR 282. 
53  See Albion Insurance Co Ltd v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1969) 121 CLR 342 
(HCA) at 350 and Mahoney v McManus (1981) 180 CLR 370 (HCA) at 378, referring to the 
“natural justice” of contribution claims; and see further, B Prewett “Wrongdoers’ Rights to 
Contribution in Mixed Liability Cases” [2012] NZ L Rev 643. 
54  Ronex Properties Ltd v John Laing Construction Ltd [1983] QB 398 (CA) at 407. 
55  See C Mitchell, P Mitchell and S Watterson Goff and Jones on the Law of Unjust Enrichment 
(11th ed, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, London, 2011) at [19-16]–[19-21]. 
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and extent”) would be given.
56
 Otherwise we may have to rely, experience 




                                                      
56  It may be significant that Blanchard and Tipping JJ, the two members of the Court who 
favoured a narrower approach, have both retired. 
57  For proposals made in 1998 and a draft Act, see Law Commission Apportionment of Civil 
Liability (NZLC R47, 1998); and see also Law Commission Review of Joint and Several 
Liability (NZLC IP32, 2012). 
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